“Language and Brain: Developmental Aspects:” Eric Lenneberg at the Neurosciences Research Program in 1972 by Arbib, Michael A.
“Language and Brain: Developmental Aspects:”




Neuroscience seems like such an established field that it may surprise readers to
learn that it (as distinct from neurophysiology and neuroanatomy as separate dis-
ciplines) was established only in 1962, with the founding of the Neurosciences Re-
search Program (NRP) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) by Fran-
cis O. Schmitt and a variety of scientists interested in the neural basis of behavior
and mind. (The Society for Neuroscience was founded in 1969 with Ralph W. Ger-
ard as Honorary President.) The NRP hosted four summer schools and multiple
Work Sessions over the next 20 years to help establish the new field. Schmitt not
only brought together a variety of brain-centered disciplines but also championed
the application of molecular biology and genetics to the study of the brain. For a
history of the NRP, see the essay by George Adelman (2010) who was for many
years librarian—and more—for the NRP.
Eric Lenneberg published Biological Foundations of Language in 1967. Five
years later, he published “Language and Brain: Developmental Aspects” (Lenneberg
1972). This was a Bulletin based on an NRP Work Session organized by Lenneberg
and held November 19–21, 1972. The report contained an edited record of the
presentations as updated by the participants, and closed with an epilogue writ-
ten by Lenneberg. This is an almost-forgotten work. When I last checked Google
Scholar (August 2017) there were more than 10,000 hits for the book, yet only 3 for
Lenneberg’s epilogue and none for the work as a whole. The aim of this article is to
bring the Bulletin to the attention of all those who value Lenneberg’s work, with the
bulletin itself made accessible on-line by presenting it as supplementary material in
the Appendix to this piece. The article first presents, and to some extent comments
on, the individual presentations at the Work Session, grouped under themes as in
the bulletin, and closes with a perspective on Lenneberg’s epilogue.
2. Neuroanatomical Approaches to the Study of Language
Georges Schaltenbrand (1972: 512–524)1 reviewed the “Neuroanatomical Aspects
of Speech and the Electrical Stimulation of the Brain.” He offered clinical obser-
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers given in the running text of this paper beyond
this point reference the original pages and respective contributions in the NRP Bulletin under
discussion (Lenneberg 1972).
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vations related to speech and other vocalizations, but his emphasis (following on
the work of Wilder Penfield) was on what he had learned from electrical stimula-
tion of patients undergoing surgery. Such data still provide a useful complement to
current research in neurolinguistics which, despite the subsequent wealth of elec-
troencephalography (EEG), positron emission tomography (PET) and functional
magnet resonance imaging (fMRI) data, still lacks a unifying framework long after
Lenneberg wrote that
[. . . ] the exact anatomical substrate for language remains elusive, es-
pecially for the cognitive side of language. [. . . ] [T]here do not seem
to be sharply delimited or structurally well defined areas that are alone
responsible for the appearance of specific clinical language deficits.
(1972: 524)
A few pages later, Lenneberg continues as follows:
Perhaps the function of [. . . ] large, transcortical, intrahemispheric fiber
tracts is more closely related to developmental events and cortical dif-
ferentiation than to “the sending of messages” between cortical func-
tional “centers.” This discussion is particularly relevant to our spec-
ulations concerning the function of the arcuate fasciculus. Since there
are homologous structures in the chimpanzee brain, it is doubtful that
man’s capacity for language is in any important way related to the pres-
ence of this fiber tract. (1972: 526)
I agree that certain pathways and structures may play their crucial role in develop-
ment, but disagree that homology disqualifies a tract from playing a distinctive role
in language. For example, Rilling et al. (2008) used diffusion tensor imaging (DTI)
to chart the very different structure of arcuate fasciculus in macaque, chimpanzee,
and human (also see the discussion by Friederici, this issue). My own perspec-
tive is that arcuate fasciculus in monkey and chimpanzee serves fine manual motor
control; and that its expansion in the human reflects the emergence of fine vocal
control.
Returning us to developmental issues, Lenneberg adds that
[t]hese facts lead to but one conclusion: There is some latitude and in-
dividual variation in the way neuroanatomical structures may mediate
specific behavior types. These variations are not likely to be random but
rather are governed by quite specific principles of the development of
brain organization. The principles may have something to do with the
concepts of critical age and sensitive period. (1972: 526–527)
3. Some Neuroembryological Principles
Given the lack of data directly linking human brain development to the general
time course of language acquisition, it was thought valuable to explore in some
detail what general neuroembryology could reveal as to developmental principles
of brain organization—even though the behavioral aspects considered were far re-
moved from humans and language. Marcus Jacobson (1972: 528–534) spoke on
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“The Problem of Regulation: The Visual System in Amphibians.” This has been
of interest to me because, from the work of (Willshaw & Malsburg 1979) onward,
the formation of retinotopic maps has been a major target for computational mod-
eling as the best worked-out example of “how the brain wires itself up” (see Bed-
nar’s chapter in Arbib & Bonaiuto 2016 and Hjorth et al. 2015 for reviews). John
Szentágothai (1972: 534–536) discussed “Plasticity in the Central Nervous System:
Its Possible Significance in Language Mechanisms.” Recent evidence of the role of
plasticity in shaping language mechanisms is the finding that the brain of a liter-
ate person has distinctive brain regions adapted for reading, the visual word form
area, for example. Dehaene & Cohen (2011) support the hypothesis that “reading
acquisition partially recycles a cortical territory evolved for object and face recog-
nition, the prior properties of which influenced the form of writing systems.” This
phenomenon has been the target of modeling by Behrmann & Plaut (2013), but will
not be considered further here.
4. Language Properties of Special Interest to Neurobiology
As part of an attempt to understand the relationship between brain and language,
the work session sought to assess the relevant properties of language by reviewing
attempts (as available in 1972) to provide formal descriptions of grammar.
Terence Langendoen (1972: 537–539) asked “Is the Theory of Generative
Grammar Relevant to Neurobiology?” and answered that Chomsky’s (1957, 1965)
competence theory is not of primary relevance—a conclusion I would agree with
even today, despite Chomsky’s major recasting of his theories across the decades
(Arbib 2012: 47–71): rules of grammar should not be confused with the rules that
govern the processes of comprehension and production. Langendoen outlined a
long series of developmental stages in speech production that yields a set of highly
specific phonological rules, while arguing that one should treat the syllable as the
proper unit in phonology, not the phoneme.
Ed Klima and Ursula Bellugi (1972: 539–550) introduced “Language in An-
other Mode,” their research on sign languages of the deaf, especially American Sign
Language (ASL) and its acquisition as a first language by deaf children of deaf par-
ents (for an updated overview see Bellugi et al., this issue). Following on Stokoe’s
argument (1960) that ASL was indeed a language rather than an unstructured col-
lection of gestures, Klima and Bellugi showed that ASL had a grammar that shared
certain properties with a spoken language like, for example, English but had certain
distinctive properties exploiting the visuo-manual mode of communication, and
explored the distinction between ASL and Chinese Sign Language (CSL; Klima &
Bellugi 1979 presents the result of this research). (Note that we now accept sign lan-
guages as human languages in their own right—the grammar of ASL versus CSL
does not reflect the differences between the grammars of spoken American English
and Chinese.) Klima and Bellugi note that sign languages differ from spoken lan-
guages in the way the hands and face can exploit simultaneity:
Though sign language may well have its roots in pantomime, it is clear
that internal pressures toward systematization have resulted in a reanal-
ysis of what may have been highly iconic into what seems to have be-
come increasingly arbitrary. (1972: 550)
466 Biolinguistics F Forum F
Since 1972, sign languages have offered a strong counter-balance to spoken lan-
guages and have suggested to some (but perhaps still a minority of) researchers
in language evolution the plausibility of a gestural role in language origins, with
the path to speech being indirect (Arbib 2012, Armstrong et al. 1994, Armstrong &
Wilcox 2007, Kendon 2002). But crucial data for Lenneberg’s concerns come from
post-1972 studies on development of gesture in relation to speech and sign (Caselli
et al. 2012), sign language aphasia (Poizner et al. 1987) and fMRI studies (Emmorey
et al. 2014, Emmorey & Özyürek 2014), to name just a few. Returning to the theme
of neural plasticity, important information can be gleaned for how having a signed
versus spoken language can differentially remodel the brain (recall the earlier dis-
cussion of Dehaene et al. 2010).
5. Language in the Clinic
Here the attempt was to revisit the then century-old study of aphasias from a mod-
ern perspective. Simeon Locke (1972: 551–555) gave ”A Neurologist’s Point of
View.” He raised two “ambitious, and perhaps unanswerable” questions: (1) What
is the evidence that language in the human is “innate” (leaving open the possibility
that instead of being preprogrammed, all that is there is the potential, which is then
developed)? (2) In what sense is language an extension of preexisting systems, and
in what sense does it exploit new principles?
As the studies of Klima and Bellugi show, language can exist without
speech. Speech, as distinguished from the speech act [. . . ], functions at
the level of acoustic percepts and can be looked at in the absence of its
semantic load. (1972: 552)
Locke reported on comparative analysis of the amount of speech produced in light
and dark by schizophrenics, aphasics and dements, concluding that schizophrenics
speak far less in the dark, suggesting that for them at least visual perception is a
key to language production. In fact, language production has been far less studied
than comprehension in neurolinguistics, and I would suggest that we should look
at the “action-perception cycle” generally to ground our understanding of how lan-
guage emerged as a new medium of communication as compared with nonhuman
primates.
Roch Lecours (1972: 555-564) took up “Linguistic Analysis of Paraphasias,”
focusing on the case in which words are transformed by replacement of a single
linguistic segment, while considering a range of variations of what might broadly
be called Wernicke’s aphasia (i.e., with the emphasis on errors of production):
One might suggest that the semantic incoherence of jargonaphasic ma-
terial, which sometimes precludes all possibility of linguistic communi-
cation with subjects whose productions contain too many compounded
and complex verbal transformations, is not necessarily the behavioral
manifestation of a conceptual deficit. [. . . ] [It is] the result of an expres-
sive, rather than a conceptual, disorder. To the listener, the sequence is
no doubt quite incoherent; but its significance for the speaker’s linguis-
tic deficit might indeed be of the same order as that of a mere phonemic
paraphasia. (1972: 564)
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The general notion here is that by seeing what may go wrong on the path from
semantic structure to motor control, one might get a new handle on grammatical
structure (cf. Langendoen’s observations, informed by study of language acquisi-
tion).
6. Development of Motor, Language, and Cognitive Behavior
Building on Langendoen’s work, there were five presentations on various forms of
development in humans. Tom Twitchell (1972: 565-569) integrated this with brain
damage in “Development of Motor Coordination in the Presence of Cerebral Le-
sions,” demonstrating that it is easier to see how labyrinthine and proprioceptive
mechanisms related to body posture and simple movements are acting than to en-
visage the role of cutaneous sensory-motor mechanisms in motor function in health
and disease. Primitive ballistic movements of, for example, manual control provide
the necessary interactions from which coordinated behavior can emerge. (Oztop et
al. 2004 offered a computational model for how, over perhaps 9 months, the grasp
reflex can be replaced by visually guided preshaping of the hand during reach.)
If one looks at the development of motor function following cerebral le-
sion at birth, the story is one of gradual improvement rather than grad-
ual development of abnormalities. Often the improvement in function
is so small over the life of the patient that it is of no use to him. One may
see improvement occurring (provided it is not a learned type of utiliza-
tion of the residual mechanism) in the same manner as in the normal
infant. (1972: 569)
Lenneberg notes
[. . . ] that synergisms for sucking, mastication, and deglutition are phys-
iologically separable from synergisms for speech articulation; the latter
are later in development than the former. In abnormal development one
may find normal anatomy and movements of oropharyngeal structures;
the young patient has no difficulty in negotiating liquid or solid food.
(1972: 569)
He then calls for studies akin to Twitchell’s on motor control. (Interestingly, Lenne-
berg had at that time already sent off one of his graduate students to study the
development of motor control, cf. Cohen, this issue).
Colwyn Trevarthen (1972: 570–585) offers an extended account of “The Psy-
chobiology of Speech Development” in the only part of the Bulletin to be widely
cited (over 100 times). He also discusses his commisurectomy studies with Roger
Sperry. A diversity of studies with infants attest to his thesis that
[t]he mechanism of intelligent action, employing a number of aimable
and tunable receptors in unison for detection of structure in the world, is
one in which a common space context, defined in innately wired circuits
of the brain to represent the body’s field of action, is used to obtain se-
lective foci. [. . . ] Separate focalizing and information-analyzing organs
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like eyes, hands, and mouth can pursue separate local goals individu-
ally, but all are periodically brought together and united in a common
orienting field of behavior that shares one time base for its actions. This
basic structure could not have been put together by learning or any pro-
cess of association of initially free and independent parts. (1972: 570)
This then places language development firmly within the context of the child’s
interaction with the world. He discusses visual space in the neonate, voluntary
reaching for objects, and (moving toward communication) prespeech in neonates
to show that
[. . . ] the roots of social communication of experience and intention are
well established at birth and that they begin to function before inani-
mate objects are perceived or used effectively. (1972: 579)
Prespeech is
[. . . ] a highly specific, quieter follow-up of the smile in which the baby,
with gaze somewhat defocused from the mother’s eye and often un-
smiling, performs elaborate lip and tongue movements, sometimes with
compressed breath. (1972: 581)
Trevarthen found
[. . . ] abundant evidence that speech has evolved out of the need for
communication of intention and experience between beings of like psy-
chological organization, with the same manner and cadence of attend-
ing to the events in the common environment, yet each with his own
unique point of view on the world. (1972: 585)
This concept of intersubjectivity draws our attention to locate language within a
context of social interaction. In recent years, Trevarthen has extended his study of
intersubjectivity to include musicality (Malloch & Trevarthen 2009); whereas the
relation between language and music poses a continuing challenge (Arbib 2013).
Tom Bever (1972: 585–588) addresses “The Relation of Language Develop-
ment to Cognitive Development,” starting by noting there are different types of
linguistic knowledge such as grammatical knowledge, understanding of language,
and speaking—and they interact. How do children perceive sequences of words?
Bever demonstrates this by showing how at age two they have a stereotyped way of
interpreting sentences that supports comprehension of parts of some sentences but
not others, and observes how this changes by age four. The topic of language acqui-
sition remains highly pertinent. A strict reliance on an innate Universal Grammar
(e.g., Lightfoot 2006) seems mistaken (Arbib 2007), but computational modeling in
concert with large databases seems to show real progress (Chang 2015, MacWhin-
ney 2014).
Jonas Langer (1972: 588-596) discussed “The Ontogeny of Cognitive Func-
tions.” He posited three stages for the development of conceptual intelligence: pre-
sentational transformation upon objects, representational transformation upon ob-
jects, and operational transformation and assessed advances in symbolic systems of
action that accompany conceptual progress. He argued that the evidence, though
incomplete, seems to support the
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[. . . ] working hypotheses that: (1) Conceptual activity defines the pace
or sets the limits for symbolic development. (2) Conceptual develop-
ment cannot be outstripped by symbolic development. [. . . ] [He] sum-
marized cognitive development as a shift from interaction and concern
[. . . ] with actual phenomena or objects located in the environment to a
consideration [. . . ] of possible phenomena located in his own thoughts.
The character of the neural substrates that are necessary for such a shift
is not at all clear. It seems reasonable to suggest, however, that such a
cognitive shift is unlikely without a parallel inhibition of neural interac-
tion with concrete external events accompanied by a relative activation
of intraneural interaction. (1972: 595–596)
One may note here the concern with “mental time travel” that moves language and
thought beyond the here-and-now (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997, Suddendorf &
Corballis 2007)—but much remains to be done to secure the neural foundations for
this expansion of cognitive perspective.
7. Neurobiological Aspects of Animal Communication
Three of the last four presentations asked what could be learned from the study of
songbirds. In “Cerebral Lateralization in Birds” Fernando Nottebohm (1972: 597–
602) discussed his seminal work on “Central Neural Mechanisms of Vocalizations
in Birds,” Juan Delius (1972: 602–607) reviewed “Central Neural Mechanisms of
Vocalizations in Birds,” while Mark Konishi explored “The Development of Audi-
tory Sensitivity in Relation to Mother-Young Vocal Communication in Birds” (pos-
sibly an echo of Trevarthen’s intersubjectivity?). The study of birdsong and its de-
velopment, and speculation as to its relation to language, has been very active since
these pioneering contributions and so I simply provide a few references to recent
research (Berwick et al. 2011, Bolhuis & Everaert 2013, Fitch & Jarvis 2013, Petkov
& Jarvis 2012). Since birdsong lacks semantics, it does not provide a model for the
“compositional semantics” that language provides; it may better be regarded as
exhibiting something akin to a “phonological syntax” (Yip 2010).
Finally, Detlev Ploog returned discussion to primates with his analysis of
“Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Aspects of Vocal Behavior in Squirrel Monkeys.”
An updated review is provided by (Jürgens 2002, 2009), whereas Aboitiz has placed
monkey vocalization and human language within an evolutionary framework, while
noting that voice and manual gesture may have played complementary roles in the
evolution of the human language-ready brain (Aboitiz 2012, 2017). Thus, the study
of ape gesture may be a valuable bridge in assessing how language evolved (Arbib
et al. 2008, Rossano & Liebal 2014, Slocombe et al. 2011).
8. Epilogue
Lenneberg’s epilogue to the collected presentations is divided into ten sections.
Here are the key points that Lenneberg made in each section.
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8.1. Language, Speech, and Speakers
Lenneberg states that
[l]anguage is a system or a “structure” of relations. Relational features
pervade every aspect—semantics, syntax, and phonology. [. . . ] [A]nd
the reality of these points was driven home to engineers in recent years
when they discovered that no mechanical device can recognize speech
sound patterns (or syntactic structures) unless it is capable of making
elaborate computations of relations. (1972: 619)
A few years later, HEARSAY provided an example of a speech understanding sys-
tem employing cooperative computation across the levels (Erman et al. 1980, Lesser
et al. 1975); Arbib and Caplan (1979) offered initial ideas on the relevance of this to
neurolinguistics.
Lenneberg then points out that
[i]n order to assign phonemic values to sounds, the object [i.e. biological
organism] must “compute” relationships between given acoustic het-
erogeneities [. . . ]. Syntactic and semantic relationships [. . . ] are “com-
puted” in intimate connection with the organism’s cognitive activities
(including perception, memory, recognition—in short, knowledge) con-
cerning the world around it. The computation of relationships is in-
volved when relationships in the environment are assessed or verified,
or when a speaker issues a statement or makes an assertion about rela-
tionships that supposedly hold for certain conditions. (1972: 619)
He continues by saying that
[t]hese considerations should make it clear that language reception and
language production are both dependent upon a common, unified mech-
anism [. . . ]. (1972: 619)
Perhaps this is misleading. Thus, where Lenneberg asks “Where is language lo-
cated, whatever it may turn out to be?” (p. 620), I would rather speak of “orches-
trating” diverse mechanisms for production and comprehension, while noting that
learning may have altered not only these mechanisms but their patterns of interac-
tion with others (recall the earlier discussion of reading).
Next, Lenneberg goes on by discussing the explanatory value of association.
He remarks that
[f]or about a century we have been satisfied with the use of association
as an explanatory concept. This has engendered the false impression
that language knowledge is simply a collection of associative bonds that
may be established within the organism by manipulations from the out-
side and, therefore, that language knowledge may be introduced into a
basically passive recipient by any clever trainer. Linguists, especially
Chomsky (1957) and his students, have argued compellingly against
this view. Observations on clinical language disorders as well as on the
normal ontogeny of language development similarly militate against
the idea that language consists of immutable items (such as fixed asso-
ciations) that are either present in an organism or not. (1972: 621)
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The modern challenge, also discussed by Trettenbrein and Chomsky (this issue),
then is to assess what notion of grammar may best support a study of language
use—with perception and production providing occasions for learning and them-
selves changing (and changing in their relation to action, perception and cognitive
processes) in the process. My own vote is to seek a neurologically constrained
variant of construction grammar in which meaning and form are intertwined in
each construction. Moreover, when we take a performance view, the elements of
grammar may constitute dynamic schemas which differ between those available
for comprehension and those for perception.
8.2. Language Development
Lenneberg starts out by saying that
[t]he general trend [of language development] is always from a global,
undifferentiated whole towards greater and greater specificity. One is
reminded of Coghill’s (1930) concept of individuation in the develop-
ment of motor coordination, which has been mentioned by Twitchell.
(1972: 621)
This sets the stage for what may be read as Lenneberg’s manifesto for the
work session’s overall theme of “Language and Brain: Developmental Aspects:”
The phonemic structure develops as a system of contrasts and relations
(as Jakobson, 1941, showed [. . . ])—not as a linear augmentation of a
speech sound repertoire. In syntax, the first joining of words represents
an undifferentiated, primitive predicative relation; one word seems to
be a comment on the other, but at first it is often not clear which of
the words is the topic and which the comment. As sentences increase
in length and syntactic complexity, the syntactic relations become more
specialized and differentiated; words begin to function more and more
clearly as specific syntactic categories. Likewise, in the realm of seman-
tics, the child’s usage of words is at first global and, to the adult ob-
server, sloppy. Gradually the primitive semantic fields contract, and
more and more precise semantic relationships emerge. This general
trend suggests that the underlying neuronal activities responsible for
language go through a developmental history themselves, starting from
a maturationally undifferentiated stage and moving towards an ever-
increasing degree of specialization and differentiation. (1972: 622)
He goes on to say that
[w]hat is maturing is a capacity for computing special kinds of relations
and relations between these relations. (1972: 623)
8.3. Biological Aspects of Language Development
Here, Lenneberg starts by saying that
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[. . . ] one of the most general principles of embryogenesis may also be
active in the specific (biological) maturational processes underlying lan-
guage development. I should like to call this principle morphogeny, the
embryological trend of local accumulation of anatomical structure and
of physiological order. Developing organisms are morphogenic sys-
tems. (1972: 623)
(Compare his note on Waddington on his page 631.)
But perhaps it is not quite so obvious that the development of behavior
is actually an extension of embryogenesis. [. . . ] An animal’s behavior is
but the outward manifestation of physiological and anatomical interac-
tions under the impact of environmental stimulations. (1972: 624)
This integration of function and development sits well with the notion of evo-devo
(also discussed by Piattelli-Palmarini in this issue), that evolution yields develop-
mental systems rather than directly specifying adult forms. Extending Trevarthen’s
intersubjectivity, we may now place increasing emphasis on evo-devo-socio—since
human language is indeed a primary shaper and shapee of sociocultural evolution.
Next, Lenneberg takes up the now familiar distinction between internal and
external language:
[. . . ] [L]anguage may develop at the normal chronological age in chil-
dren with peripheral handicaps that block the normal outward expres-
sion of language. Studies have been made of several children with mo-
tor deficits due to fixed CNS [central nervous system] lesions who have
never been able to make speech sounds but who have developed lan-
guage knowledge normally by listening to and interacting with speak-
ing adults. This illustrates that the “mental” exercise of language may
be distinguished from the physical output of language, i.e., from speech
[. . . ] (1972: 625)
Lastly, he concludes the section by noting that
The idea that the exercise of language itself contributes to and alters the
structural complexity of the language system is, incidentally, argument
against regarding the brain as a finite-state computer. Though the ar-
gument here is based on different considerations from those used by
Chomsky (1957), the conclusion is the same as his. (1972: 625)
But such agreement does not endorse a competence theory of generative grammar
as the “solution.” A rich learning theory of the child’s language use while interact-
ing with the physical and social environment is the goal of Lenneberg’s enterprise.
8.4. Maturation of the CNS and Language
Here, Lenneberg’s key point is that
[. . . ] normal histological and functional development of the mammalian
brain is dependent both on the availability of certain sensory stimula-
tion and on the opportunity or processing such information and engag-
ing in correlated behavior. The meager evidence concerning language
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capability in criminally deprived (or wolf-)children seems to support
the view that man, too, must be exposed to language during the last
stages of brain development or else suffer irreversible language deficits
(Lenneberg, 1967). The experiments reported by Szentágothai stress the
importance of the interaction between environmental input and mat-
urationally developing patterns, especially of synaptic arrangements.
[. . . ] The most dramatic maturational event of clearcut relevance to lan-
guage is the hemispheric specialization for language that occur largely
during the most active period of language acquisition. (1972: 626)
8.5. The Localization Issue
Lenneberg already provided a modern way of thinking about the question of local-
ization of language functions. He says:
In my opinion [. . . ] the cortical loci in question gradually come to be
specialized [. . . ] to contribute in a particular physiological manner to
those activity patterns that form the neuronal basis or behavior [. . . ].
Behavior such as language is not the product of one particular spot ei-
ther in the cortex or in any of the subcortical nuclei. Very many parts
of the brain must contribute to the proper function or a behavior that is
as inseparable from perception, memory, concept formation, and every
other cognitive process as is language. (1972: 627)
And, we may add, the different motor demands of spoken and signed language.
Indeed, Lenneberg continues with examples from motor coordination and its im-
pairment.
Lenneberg rejects the
[. . . ] notion of centers with principal control over any particular kind
of circumscribed behavior. The brain is not a loose aggregate of au-
tonomous organs, but a single organ (Locke and Trevarthen, this Bul-
letin). Its anatomical subdivisions undoubtedly have their own specific
physiological functions, contributing to various types of behavior in dif-
ferent ways. But, so far we know of no behavioral entity that is the
exclusive product of just one brain region alone. (1972: 628–629)
Again, I would rather speak of distributed or cooperative computation across di-
verse subsystems rather than speak of “a single organ,” since this draws attention
from the way the overall system changes with development and can reconfigure
itself to meet the needs of different situations. I think Lenneberg would be content
with this reformulation.
8.6. Ontogeny of Behavior
Here, Lenneberg says the following:
Denny-Brown’s concept of amorphosynthesis (Denny-Brown et al., 1952)
foreshadowed a new interpretation of the interrelation between the two
hemispheres, which has been most lucidly presented by (Kinsbourne,
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1974). [. . . ] He postulates, as Denny-Brown had done before him, a state
of functional balance between the hemispheres that continues through-
out life, even though the compensatory capacities are lost at the termi-
nation of the maturational phase of the brain. [. . . ] [But] differentiation
that takes place between birth and adolescence and that results in hemi-
spheric functional specialization does not turn one side of the brain into
an independent language organ. It causes physiological functions to be
more selectively distributed between the left and the right side; it does
not abolish all interdependence. [. . . ] Twitchell’s and Trevarthen’s pre-
sentations [. . . ] [illustrate] how original primitive reflexes (or, perhaps
better, “prototype acts”) gradually come to be transformed into effective
motor patterns, resulting in new capabilities in motor control. As brain
tissues become more and more differentiated, they [. . . ] transform the
previous types of functions into newly integrated patterns. (1972: 630)
8.7. The Embryological Concept of Regulation Applied to Language Development
Lenneberg begins this section by saying that
[t]he compensatory powers of the infantile human brain with respect
to language-relevant brain regions may be [. . . ] [an] example of [. . . ]
[the] regulatory phase of ernbryogenesis. When this period comes to
a close, the second phase, one speaks of determination of tissues. [. . . ]
[T]he organism can no longer rearrange itself to reconstitute the original
manner of function or shape. However, even then there are mechanisms
in certain animals that may compensate for loss. Regeneration is one
such mechanism, though it is irrelevant to language and its biological
substrate. (1972: 639)
Given the discovery of formation of new neurons in adult hippocampus, it may be
time to see to what extent this may provide new mechanisms for language plasticity
even long after key “critical periods” have long since passed.
8.8. Stability of the Course of Development
Here, Lenneberg says that
[t]he tendency for a growing organism to follow a fairly narrowly de-
fined trajectory of development and to be able to return to that trajectory
even if it is temporarily deviated from its prescribed path has [. . . ] been
the subject of much discussion in theoretical biology, particularly by
Waddington, who refers to the phenomenon as homeorhesis, and by the
biologists who have joined him in a series of study groups (Wadding-
ton, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972) [of which I (MAA) was one]. Formative
principles of this sort are by no means restricted to biological growth.
[. . . ] There is no way for a system to reach any one given stage without
having first traversed the stages that led to it. [. . . ] [But] there are also
examples in the experimental animal literature and in human embryol-
ogy in which fetal or perinatal lesions seem at first to leave the infant
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unharmed but produce symptoms at a later stage of development. [. . . ]
At first these findings may appear to be paradoxical. However, we may
yet learn to fit them into a consistent model if we try to explain them
in terms of morphogeny and homeorhesis. In cases where the animal
preparation or the patient gradually grows into the symptoms, the de-
velopmental preconditions for future pattern formation have been in-
terfered with. (1972: 631–632)
He continues as follows:
It is in these terms that we should also look at language development.
[. . . ] One of the most intriguing aspects of comparisons between human
language and animal communication is precisely the various courses
of development of these species-specific behavior types. The work of
Konishi and of Nottebohm is especially a propos here. (1972: 632)
8.9. Brain Stimulation Data
Regarding the means for studying the neural substrates of language processing at
the time Lenneberg says that
[o]ur theories for brain mechanisms of language are based, essentially,
on two types of evidence: electrical brain stimulation in unanesthetized
man, as discussed by Schaltenbrand, and postmortem examination of
brain lesions. (1972: 633)
Here, as noted earlier, the relevant database has expanded dramatically (or even
overwhelmingly?) to include a wealth of data gained used EEG, PET, fMRI, and
other techniques, and these are complemented by comparative neurobiology with
other primates as well as further developments in the study of birdsong. Very much
as Lenneberg notes with reference to Ploog’s presentation, there are
fundamental, physiological differences between brain correlates of vo-
calization in man and in so-called lower primates, as well as important
similarities and homologies relevant to the correlates of vocalization.
(1972: 634)
Aboitiz (2017) offers a perspective on the evolution of brain mechanisms for speech
rooted in comparative neuroanatomy of monkeys and humans; see also my call for
a (computational) comparative neuroprimatology (Arbib 2016).
8.10. Clinico-Pathological Correlations
Lenneberg turns finally, to the “morbid anatomy” giving rise to language distur-
bances and summarizes
the consensus of the neurologists present [at the Workshop] as follows.
There is no lesion that is capable of totally abolishing language capabil-
ities (more specifically, language knowledge) without at the same time
interfering dramatically with many other cognitive functions. Clinical
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speech and language disorders that are acquired in adult life present as
both reduction and distortion of normal language patterns. [. . . ] Per-
haps the most important suggestion for future work in the area of apha-
sia that issued from the interaction with developmental biologists at this
Work Session is the analysis of language disorders in their developmen-
tal perspective: the consequence of lesions in childhood and the course
and progress in the formation of symptoms or recovery from symptoms.
(1972: 635)
9. Conclusion
Lenneberg stated that at the time of the Work Session, there was
only one type of scientific theory of language structure available, gen-
erative grammar, and this was never intended to serve as a model for
biological language mechanisms. [. . . ] What is most urgently needed is
a theory of sentence production and comprehension that has the formal
precision of Chomsky’s approach but is explicitly intended to explicate
the psychobiological underpinnings of language capabilities.
(1972: 635)
Elsewhere, I have argued that computational construction grammar may pro-
vide such a framework, while stressing that the very diversity of formulations
for such a grammar requires a synthesis of the lessons to be learnt from diverse
approaches such as those of Embodied Construction Grammar (Bergen & Chang
2005, Feldman 2010), Template Construction Grammar (Arbib 2017, Arbib & Lee
2008), Fluid Construction Grammar (Steels 2004, Beuls & Steels 2013), and Dy-
namic Construction Grammar (Hinaut et al. 2015). However, what is striking
about Lenneberg’s Work Session is the relative unimportance of linguistic anal-
ysis and the emphasis on seeking insights from neuroembryology and from the
development—and disorders—of motor and perceptual skills and the diverse break-
downs of language function in aphasia. These insights—and those that have ex-
tended them in the last 45 years—remain crucial, even as we seek new computa-
tional models of language comprehension and production and link them to new
sources of data on the human brain and the comparative study of other species.
Appendix
The Supplementary Material contains scans of the original article Lenneberg (1972),
prefaced with a republication note that also addresses the copyright situation. It
is available for download here: https://biolinguistics.eu/index.php/
biolinguistics/article/downloadSuppFile/507/84
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